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The  1970 amendments  to  the  Bank  Holding  Com- 
pany  Act,  which  brought  one-bank  holding  com- 
panies  under  the  regulation  of  the  Federal  Reserve 
System,  provided  stimulus  for  the  formation  of  new 
bank  holding  companies,  for  the  acquisition  of  inde- 
pendent  commercial  banks  by  these  corporations,  and 
for  the  expansion  by  holding  companies  into  nonbank 
activities  permitted  under  Federal  regulation,  At 
the  time  of  enactment  of  the  amendments,  111  regis- 
tered  bank  holding  companies  controlled  6.6  percent 
of  insured  commercial  banks  and  16.1 percent  of bank 
deposits  in  the  United  States.  By  the  end  of  1978, 
2,113  holding  companies  controlled  27.9  percent  of  all 
domestic  banks  and  67  percent  of  bank  deposits.1 
Liberalization  of  the  criteria  for  permitting  nonbank 
activities  in  1970 also  produced  an  expansion  in bank 
holding  company  investment  in  nonbank  subsidiaries. 
It  has  been  estimated  that  these  companies  control 
nonbank  firms  with  combined  assets  of  $50  to  $55 
billion,  approximately  five  percent  of  the  total  assets 
of  the  commercial  banking  system  [11]. 
Research  on  the  holding  company  movement  has, 
until  recently,  concentrated  on  the  impact  it  has  had 
on  bank  performance,  bank  safety  and  soundness, 
and  competition  in banking  markets.  Also  of  interest 
is  the  performance  of  nonbank  subsidiaries  and  their 
effect  on  the  consolidated  firm.  Analysis  of  this 
question,  unfortunately,  has  been  hampered  by  data 
limitations.  Recently,  however,  attention  has  been 
devoted  to  the  financial  performance  of  nonbank 
affiliates.  After  summarizing  some  of  the  findings  of 
this  recent  research,  this  article  will  briefly  examine 
the  economic  rationale  for  bank  holding  company 
diversification.  Finally,  it  will  report  on  investment 
by  Fifth  District  firms  in  subsidiaries  engaged  in 
nonbanking  activities  and  on  the  recent  relative  profit 
performances  of  nonbank  affiliates. 
* The  author  would  like  to  acknowledge  the  assistance 
of  the  staff  of  the  Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal 
Reserve  System  in  obtaining  the  data  used  in  this 
article  and  the  computational  and  analytical  assistance  of 
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1 Annual  Statistical  Digest  and  internal  records,  Board  of 
Governors  of the  Federal  Reserve  System. 
Nonbank  Activities  and  Performance  The  Board 
of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System  has 
authority  to  allow  holding  companies  to own  shares 
in  any  company  engaged  in  activities  the  Board  has 
determined  to  be  “so  closely  related  to  banking  or 
managing  or  controlling  banks  as  to  be  a  proper 
incident  thereto.”2  In  exercising  its  authority,  the 
Board  has  created  a list  of  approved  activities.3  To  a 
large  degree,  approved  activities  are  limited  to  those 
that  national  banks  are  permitted  to  engage  in 
directly.  The  only  activities  on  the  list  prohibited  to 
national  banks  are  industrial  banking  and  underwrit- 
ing  credit  life,  accident,  and  health  insurance.  Bank 
holding  companies,  however,  have  concentrated  their 
investment  in  relatively  few  of  these  nonbanking 
activities.  Investment  in  nonbank  lending  operations 
(finance  companies,  mortgage  banking,  leasing  and 
factoring)  has  been  particularly  widespread.  In 
addition,  many  companies  own  subsidiaries  engaged 
in  credit  insurance  activities  and  firms  that  provide 
internal  services  for  the  holding  company  and  its 
affiliates,  such  as  data  processing.  A  glossary  of 
nonbank  activities  engaged  in  most  frequently  by 
banking  organizations  accompanies  this  article. 
Several  recent  studies  have  evaluated  the  financial 
impact  of  selected  nonbank  activities  on  the  parent 
corporation.  In  general,  their  findings  suggest  that 
returns  to  holding  companies  from  these  operations 
have  not  matched  returns  experienced  by  non- 
affiliated  firms.  These  conclusions  are  based  upon 
comparisons  of  the  performance  of  nonbank  subsidi- 
aries  with  independent  companies  in  the  respective 
industries  or  with  industry  averages.4  Talley  [13], 
2 In  determining  whether  a  particular  activity  is  a  proper 
incident  to  banking,  the  Board  must  consider  whether  its 
performance  by  an  affiliate  of  a  holding  company  can 
reasonably  be  expected  to  produce  benefits  to  the  public, 
such  as  greater  convenience,  increased  competition,  or 
gains  in  efficiency,  that  outweigh  possible  adverse  effects, 
such  as  undue  concentration  of  resources,  decreased  or 
unfair  competition,  conflicts  of  interest,  or  unsound 
banking  practices.  Bank  Holding  Company  Act,  Section 
4(c)(8). 
3 Regulation  Y,  Section  225.4(a)  (12  CFR  225). 
4 For  a  review  of  this  literature,  see  [2]. 
2  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  NOVEMBER/DECEMBER  1979 Boczar  and  Rhoades  [1],  and  Rice  [7]  examined 
the  relative  performance  of  affiliated  finance  com- 
panies  during  1973-76  and  found  them  less  profitable 
than  independent  firms.  Finance  company  subsidi- 
aries  experienced  an  average  rate  of  return  on  equity 
investment  of  4.7  percent  over  the  1974-76  period 
while  the  industry  averaged  a  9.3  percent  yield  over 
this  period.  In  addition,  holding  company  subsidi- 
aries  were  found  to  be  more  highly  leveraged,  more 
dependent  on short-term  financing,  and  more  likely  to 
have  a  higher  cost  of  funds  than  their  independent 
counterparts.  Profitability  of  finance  company  affili- 
ates  appeared  to  improve  significantly  in  1976  and 
1977 but  it  still  trailed  the  industry  as  a  whole  [9]. 
Bank  holding  company  mortgage  affiliates  were 
also  found  to  be less profitable  than  independent  com- 
panies  and  the  mortgage  industry  in  general.  The 
severity  of  the  1973-75  recession  in  the  real  estate 
sector  of  the  economy  and  its  repercussions  on  mort- 
gage  lenders  caused  mortgage  affiliates  to  suffer 
average  net  losses  of  2.4  percent  of  equity  per  year 
over  the  1974-76  period  while  the  industry  averaged 
losses  of  only  1.6  percent  [9,  13].  Analysis  of  the 
equipment  leasing  area  shows  that  holding  company 
subsidiaries  outperformed  the  finance  company  and 
mortgage  affiliates  of holding  companies  during  1974- 
76, yet  they  still  trailed  the  leasing  industry  average. 
Leasing  subsidiaries  averaged  an  8.5  percent  return 
on  equity  while  the  industry  average  was  9.9  percent 
[9].  Insurance  activities,  on  the  other  hand,  have 
apparently  been  quite  profitable  for  bank  holding 
companies.  Rice  [8]  found  that  affiliates  engaged  in 
insurance  underwriting  averaged  nearly  30  percent 
return  on  equity  investment  in  1976  and  1977. 
In  addition  to  comparing  bank  holding  company 
affiliate  performance  with  independent  companies 
within  respective  industries,  Rice  [9]  analyzed  total 
industry  profit  returns  for  banking  and  for  five  of  the 
leading  nonbank  activities  (consumer  finance,  sales 
finance,  mortgage  banking,  leasing,  and  life  insur- 
ance)  engaged  in  by  bank  holding  companies  from 
1970-76  and  found  that  banking  had  the  highest 
return  on  equity,  with  an  average  of  11.1  percent. 
The  consumer  finance  industry  realized  a  10.1 
percent  yield,  followed  by  9.9  percent  for  equipment 
leasing,  9.8  percent  for  sales  finance,  9.3  percent 
for  life  insurance,  and  7.7  percent  for  mortgage 
banking.  Nonbank  affiliates  of  holding  companies 
apparently  did  not  perform  as  well  (relative  to 
banking)  as  the  industry  averages  suggest.5  For 
5 As  Rice  points  out  [9],  the  relative  industry  perform- 
ances  may  not  accurately  reflect  bank  holding  company 
performance  since  their  involvement  in  some  of  these 
activities  is  restricted  or  altered  by  Regulation  Y. 
the  years  1976  and  1977,  return  on  equity  to  parent 
holding  companies  from  consolidated  investments  in 
nonbank  companies  were  only  slightly  greater  than 
half  the  average  return  from  their  bank  subsidiaries 
(6.3  percent  compared  with  over  11 percent).  Rice 
also  categorized  affiliates  into  financing  and  nonfi- 
nancing subsidiaries.6  The  returns  on  equity  invest- 
ment  from  financing  and  nonfinancing  subsidiaries 
were  5.0  percent  and  26.6  percent,  respectively. 
Moreover,  the  nonbank  activities  of  companies  with 
less  than  $500  million  in  assets  were  more  profitable 
than  for  larger  holding  companies,  apparently  be- 
cause  these  firms  held  a  larger  proportionate  invest- 
ment  in  nonfinancing  activities. 
In  summary,  available  empirical  evidence  concludes 
that  bank  holding  company  profit  performance  in 
major  permissible  nonbank  activities  has  not,  in 
general,  matched  industry  standards.  In  addition, 
average  returns  to  equity  from  nonbank  operations 
have  been  found  to  be  significantly  below  returns 
from  bank  affiliates.  What  then  is  the  economic 
benefit  or  justification  for  holding  company  expan- 
sion  into  nonbank  activities? 
Economic  Rationale  It  has  been  suggested  that 
if  “all  parent  resources  invested  in  nonbank  sub- 
sidiaries  were  instead  invested  in  bank  subsidiaries 
.  .  .,  the  BHC’s  aggregate  income  could  have  been 
increased”  substantially.7  If  this  statement  were 
true,  however,  one  might  infer  that  bank  holding 
company  managements  were  (1)  incompetent,  (2) 
not  interested  in  profit  maximization,  (3)  pro- 
hibited  from  expanding  their  bank  operations,  or 
(4)  positioning  for  interstate  banking.  Each  of  these 
inferences,  however,  has  major  weaknesses  and 
none  provides  a  fully  satisfactory  explanation  of  ob- 
served  behavior.  Since  economic  theory  suggests. 
that  firms  benefit  from  diversification  if  the  total 
profits  of  the  firm  are  increased  or  if  the  firm’s  per- 
ceived  risk  exposure  is  reduced,  further  examination 
is  required. 
Increased  Profits  Traditional  price  theory  sug- 
gests  that  the  optimal  quantity  of  output  of  a  firm  is 
determined  by  its  marginal  revenue  and  marginal 
cost  conditions.  A profit-maximizing  firm  will tend  to 
6 Financing  affiliates  were  defined  to  consist  of  finance 
companies,  mortgage  bankers,  leasing  companies,  and 
factors.  Nonfinancing  subsidiaries  were  insurance  under- 
writers  and  agencies,  management  consulting  firms,  and 
advisory  companies. 
7 This  conclusion  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  bank 
subsidiaries  could  provide  the  same  (average)  return  on 
the  additional  (marginal)  investments  [9]. 
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point  where  the  last  resource  unit  just  pays  for  itself, 
i.e.,  where  the  marginal  revenue  derived  from  that 
activity  is  equal  to  the  marginal  cost  of  production 
(MR=MC). 
It  can  be  argued,  of  course,  that  required  reserve 
ratios  and  limitations  on  the  aggregate  volume  of 
bank  reserves  restrict  a  bank’s  ability  to  increase 
output  to  the  point  where  marginal  revenue  equals 
marginal  cost  [14].  The  prohibition  on  the  explicit 
payment  of  interest  on  demand  deposits  together 
with  interest  rate  ceilings  on  other  small  deposit 
categories  virtually  guarantees  that  the  interest  on 
bank  loans  and  investments  (marginal  revenue)  will 
exceed  the  marginal  cost  of  such  funds,  at  least  in 
today’s  high  interest  rate  environment.  In  addition, 
excess  reserves  held  by  member  banks  must  be  held 
in  the  form  of  nonearning  assets.  Banks,  therefore, 
are  usually  eager  to  invest  any  excess  reserves  they 
may  hold.  There  is  not  an  unlimited  supply  of  low 
cost  funds,  however.  In  fact,  the  trend  appears  to  be 
toward  a  drying  up  of  these  sources.  To  an  increas- 
ing  degree,  banks  have  been  forced  to  rely  on  funds 
purchased  at  market  rates  of  interest  to  finance  ex- 
panded  lending  and  investments.  The  marginal 
revenue  - marginal  cost  analysis,  therefore,  does  ap- 
pear  to  be  applicable  to  the  banking  firm. 
Suppose  that  a  bank  produces  at  its  profit-maxi- 
mizing  level  and  earns  an  average  return  on  equity  of 
15  percent.  The  last  (marginal)  unit  of  banking 
services  produced,  however,  brings  in  revenue  that 
just  covers  its  cost  so that  the  marginal  yield  is zero. 
Investment  beyond  this  point  will  actually  reduce 
total  profits  since  the  cost  of  producing  additional 
units  will  exceed  additional  revenues  (MC >  MR). 
An  expansion-minded  firm  may  then  face  a  choice 
between  producing  more  banking  services  or  offering 
other  services  through  a  nonbank  subsidiary  (with, 
say,  a  ten  percent  marginal  return  on  investment). 
Which  investment  should  the  firm  make?  In  this  ex- 
ample,  it  is  clear  the  firm  should  diversify  through 
the  nonbank  subsidiary.  Investment  in  the  nonbank 
subsidiary  increases  total  profits  and  the  investment 
yields  a  higher  average  rate  of  return  for  the  total 
firm  than  does  expanding  the  banking  operations.  If 
the  existing  investment  in  banking  totaled  $1000  and 
an  additional  $100  investment  is  contemplated  with 
returns  in  banking  and  nonbanking  of  zero  and  ten 
percent,  respectively,  then  the  computations  in Table  I 
show  that  the  marginal  investment  in  the  nonbank 
activity  is  the  more  profitable  alternative.  The  total 
profit  (  )  equation  is: 
where  Wi  is  the  dollar  investment  in  the  ith’  activity 
and  Ri  is  the  activity’s  average  rate  of  return  on  in- 
vestment. 
Table I 
Total  Profits  Average  Profits 
Alternative  A 
Banking  Alone 
[(1000  x  .15)  +  (100  x  .O)]  =  150 
Alternative  B 
Banking &  Nonbanking 
[(1000 x  .15)  +  (100 x  .10)]  =  160 
Generalizing,  for  the  investment  to  favor  the  non- 
bank  subsidiary,  it  is  only  necessary  for  the  return 
on  the  marginal  investment  in  the  bank  to  be  less 
than  for  the  nonbank  activity.  The  determining  fac- 
tor,  therefore,  is how  much  the  additional  or  marginal 
investment  adds  to  the  profits  of  the  consolidated 
firm.  Average  rates  of  return  on  prior  investments 
can  give  misleading  signals  for  management  invest- 
ment  decisions.8 
The  decision  to  engage  in  nonbank  activities  might 
also  be described  by  a model  that  represents  the  com- 
pany  as  a  multiple-product,  price-discriminating 
firm  [12].  In  this  model,  the  firm  maximizes  profit 
by  segmenting  markets- credit  markets  in the  special 
case  of  a banking  firm-with  distinguishable  demand 
characteristics  and  setting  different  prices  in  each 
market  in  order  that  the  marginal  revenues  in  each 
market  are  equal.  This  behavior  may  involve  limiting 
production  in  the  most  profitable  product  markets 
and  engaging  in some  marginally  profitable  activities. 
Reduced  Risk  Theory  also  suggests  that  diversi- 
fication  into  nonbank  activities  may  reduce  risk  by 
reducing  the  variability  of  the  consolidated  firm’s 
profits.  This  could  result  from  either  of  two  sources: 
(1)  product-line  diversification,  or  (2)  geographic 
diversification.  Diversification  of  the  firm’s  product 
line  may  reduce  holding  company  risk  if  nonbank 
profits  do  not  vary  directly  with  bank  profits.  Corre- 
lation  coefficients  can  measure  the  degree  to  which 
bank  profits  and  nonbank  profits  move  together  from 
year  to  year.  Other  things  equal,  the  lower  the 
8 One  major  domestic  bank  failure  was  apparently  due, 
at  least  in  part,  to  bank  management  confusing  the  con- 
cepts  of  average  and  marginal  returns  [10]. 
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profits,  the  lower  will  be  the  variability  (standard 
deviation)  of  holding  company  profits.9 
A  number  of  recent  studies  have  reported  correla- 
tion  coefficients  between  banking  profits  and  returns 
in nonbank  activities  most  popular  with  bank  holding 
companies  [3,  4,  5, 9].  These  studies  have  generally 
indicated  that  nonbank  profits  were  not  highly  cor- 
related  with  bank  profits  and  that  several  were  nega- 
tively  correlated,  thus  implying  potential  benefits  of 
product-line  diversification.10  According  to  these 
studies,  therefore,  some  nonbank  activities  may  actu- 
ally  enhance  the  stability  of  the  consolidated  firm’s 
profit  stream. 
Bank  holding  company  risk  may  also  be  reduced 
through  a  greater  geographic  diversification  attain- 
able  via  nonbank  affiliates.  As  noted  earlier,  most 
permissible  activities  can  be  engaged  in  directly  by 
commercial  banks.  Bank  operations,  however,  are 
limited  geographically  by  state  and  Federal  branch- 
ing  statutes.  A  nonbank  affiliate  is  not  so  restricted 
and  is  free  to  expand  its  geographic  base  subject  to 
regulatory  approval.  To  the  extent  geographic  di- 
versification  insulates  company  profits  from  localized 
economic  conditions  and  contributes  to  profit  sta- 
bility,  firm  risk  may  be  reduced.  Little  evidence  is 
presently  available  on  the  contribution  (if  any)  of 
geographic  diversification  to  reducing  risk,  however. 
Fifth  District  Performance  Thirty-seven  Fifth 
District  bank  holding  companies  with  total  assets  of 
$45  billion  reported  $2.2  billion  of  nonbank  assets  as 
of  year-end  1977.11  This  figure,  representing  five 
9 The  standard  deviation  (s)  of  holding  company  profits 
will  be: 
where  wi  is  the  proportion  of  capital  invested  in  the  ith activity, 
is  the  standard  deviation  of  profits  in  the  ith activity,  and  ci, is 
the  correlation  between  profits  in  the  ith and  jth  activities.  Since 
bank  activities  constitute  the  predominant  investment  of  BHCs 
(i.e.,  they  have  the  largest  w1),  the  correlation  between  banking 
and  other  activities  will  dominate  the  right  hand  portion  of  the 
above  equation. 
10 Mortgage  banking  showed  the  highest  correlation  with 
banking  while  life  insurance  and  equipment  leasing  were 
negatively  correlated  and  consumer  finance  was  uncorre- 
lated  [9]. 
11 These  BHCs  were  located  in  the  District  of  Columbia, 
Maryland,  North  Carolina,  South  Carolina,  and  Virginia. 
A  total  of  55  bank  holding  companies  controlling  nearly 
$55  billion  in  total  assets  are  registered  in  the  Fifth 
Federal  Reserve  District.  Some  of  these,  however,  are 
themselves  subsidiaries  of  holding  companies.  Their 
inclusion  in  the  analysis,  therefore,  would  result  in  double 
counting  of  assets.  A  few  small  “grandfathered”  West 
Virginia  bank  holding  companies  were  also  excluded 
percent  of  total  assets,  understates  the  importance  of 
nonbank  operations  to  some  individual  firms,  how- 
ever.  The  nonbank  proportion  of  assets  ranged  up  to 
12.6  percent  for  one  of  the  larger  holding  companies 
in the  District.  On  the  other  hand,  four  smaller  com- 
panies  held  no  nonbank  assets  at  all.  Size  apparently 
had  little  to  do  with  participation  in  nonbank  activi- 
ties,  however.  Nineteen  holding  companies,  ranging 
in  size  from  $1.0  billion  to  over  $4.5  billion  in assets, 
held  virtually  the  same  proportion  of  total  assets  in 
nonbank  firms  as  did  the  smaller  firms.  Nine  of  the 
firms  held  more  than  six  percent  of  total  assets  in 
nonbank  subsidiaries  while  only  two  held  nonbank 
assets  that  represented  more  than  ten  percent  of  con- 
solidated  assets.  In  terms  of capital  investment,  non- 
bank  operations  account  for  a  more  substantial  share 
of  bank  holding  company  activities.  Nonbank  equity 
investment  represented  8.4  percent  of  the  firms’  total 
equity  capital. 
Table  II  shows  the  number  of  holding  companies 
owning  subsidiaries  involved  in  nonbank  activities 
along  with  the  proportions  of consolidated  assets  and 
total  nonbank  assets  accounted  for  by  each  activity. 
More  Fifth  District  bank  holding  companies  are  ac- 
tive  in  mortgage  banking  than  in  any  other  nonbank 
activity.  Twenty-five  companies  own  mortgage  sub- 
sidiaries  holding  1.45 percent  of  total  company  assets 
and  nearly  thirty  percent  of  total  nonbank  assets. 
Consumer  finance,  leasing,  and  factoring  companies 
from  the  analysis  since  state  law  has  prohibited  holding 
company  expansion  in  the  state.  These  are  primarily 
industrial  firms  that  acquired  small  banking  operations 
and  therefore,  differ  significantly  from  other  holding 
companies  within  the  District.  All  nonbank  financial  data 
were  derived  from  Bank  Holding  Company  Annual 
Reports  filed  with  the  Federal  Reserve  System. 
Table  II 
NONBANK  ACTIVITY  OF  FIFTH  DISTRICT BHCs 
Percent  of Total  Percent  of 
Number  of  BHC Assets  in  Nonbank  Assets 
BHCs Active  Activity  in Activity 
BHCs  37  100 
Bank  Subsidiaries  37  95.1 
Mortgage  Banking  25  1.45  29.7 
Consumer  Finance  16  .88  18.0 
Sales  Finance  5  .27  5.5 
Commercial  Finance  5  .27  5.5 
Leasing  21  .53  10.9 
Factoring  4  .60  12.3 
Insurance  19  .18  3.7 
Data  Processing  16  .10  2.1 
Other  .60  12.3 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  5 also  accounted  for  significant  shares of  total  nonbank 
assets,  although  each  Activity  represented  less  than 
one  percent  of  total  bank  holding  company  assets.  A 
number  of  companies  also  own  active  subsidiaries 
engaged  in  consumer  finance,  leasing,  insurance,  and 
data  processing-although  the  latter  two  activities  do 
not  represent  a  substantial  share  of  nonbank  assets. 
The  dominance  of  subsidiaries  engaged  in  extending 
credit  is  demonstrated  by  the  aggregate  81.9  percent 
proportion  of  total  nonbank  assets  held  by  mortgage, 
finance  company,  leasing,  and  factoring  subsidiaries. 
Analysis  of  the  profitability  of  bank  holding  com- 
pany  subsidiaries  in  the  Fifth  District  supports  the 
conclusions  of previous  studies.  Compared  with  bank 
affiliates,  the  financing  subsidiaries  reported  lower 
rates  of  return  on  equity  investment  while  nonfinan- 
cing  affiliates  reported  higher  rates  of  return.  Table 
III  shows  the  average  returns  on  assets  and  equity 
capital,  as  well  as  the  equity  to  assets  ratios  for  each 
activity  over  the  1975-78  period.  The  non-weighted 
average  return  on  equity  of  financing  affiliates  was 
6.46  percent  over  the  entire  period  compared  with 
slightly  over  twelve  percent  for  the  bank  affiliates  of 
holding  companies.  Within  this  category,  mortgage 
subsidiaries  reported  the  lowest  returns  with  an aver- 
age  return  on  equity  investment  of  2.55  percent. 
Sales  finance,  factoring,  and  leasing  were  the  most 
profitable  of  the  financing  affiliates  but  each  was  out- 
performed  by  the commercial  banks.  Subsidiaries 
involved  in  insurance  activities,  on  the  other  hand, 
constituted  the  single  most  profitable  activity,  realiz- 
ing  an  average  annual  return  on  equity  of  over  sixty 
percent.  Data  processing  activities  yielded  only  7.3 
percent  return  on  investment  but  most  of  these  affili- 
ates  simply  provide  computer  support  for  the  cor- 
poration  itself  and  are  intended  as  little  more  than 
break-even  operations.  The  few  subsidiaries  within 
the  District  that  were  engaged  principally  in  provid- 
ing  data  processing  services  to  the  general  public,  in 
contrast,  averaged  a  robust  42  percent  return  on 
equity  over  the  period. 
The  nonbank  affiliates  realized  substantially  higher 
net  returns  on  total  assets  than  did  the  banks.  This 
is  in  marked  contrast  with  results  obtained  when 
relative  profits  are  measured  by  return  on  equity. 
Banking,  at  .84  percent,  was  the  only  activity  that 
averaged  less  than  one  percent  return  on  assets. 
Nonbank  returns  ranged  from  1.2 percent  for  mort- 
gage  banking  and  leasing  to  over  four  percent  for 
consumer  finance  affiliates  and  over  twenty  percent 
for  insurance  subsidiaries. 
The  apparently  contradictory  profit  ratios  reflect 
the  high  degree  of  leveraging  evident  in  bank  oper- 
Table  III 
RETURN ON  ASSETS AND  EQUITY  CAPITAL, 
AND  EQUITY  TO  ASSETS RATIOS 
BANK  AND  NONBANK  SUBSIDIARIES 
1975-1978 
Net  Income/  Net  Income/ 
Assets  Equity  Capital  Equity/Assets 
(%)  (%)  (%) 
Bank  Subsidiaries  .84  12.06  6.9 
Mortgage  Banking  1.20  2.55  19.7 
Consumer  Finance  4.26  7.84  29.4 
Sales  Finance  3.07  10.84  18.3 
Commercial  Finance  1.63  6.34  12.3 
Leasing  1.20  8.62  21.3 
Factoring  3.49  8.71  23.6 
Insurance  20.88  63.53  47.2 
Data  Processing  2.10  7.29  58.4 
ations  relative  to  nonbank  activities.  Banks  fund  a 
much  larger  proportion  of assets  with  borrowed  funds 
(deposits)  while  nonbank  subsidiaries  rely  more  on 
capital  injected  from  the  parent  corporation.  If  non- 
bank  subsidiaries  were  leveraged  to  the  same  degree 
as  their  affiliate  banks,  returns  on  equity  might  be 
higher.12  Banks  have  a  distinct  advantage  over  non- 
bank  affiliates  in  their  access  to  a  stable,  dependable 
deposit  base.  It  is  difficult  to  know,  therefore, 
whether  return  on  assets  or  return  on  equity  is  the 
most  appropriate  profit  measure  when  comparing 
affiliates. 
Table  III  also  gives  the  average  equity  capital  to 
total  assets  ratios  for  bank  and  nonbank  activities  of 
Fifth  District  companies  over  the  1975-78  period. 
The  bank  ratio  averages  only  6.9  percent,  consider- 
ably  lower  than  that  of any  other  activity.  The  finan- 
cing  affiliates  generally  had  from  two  to  four  times 
as  much  equity  per  asset  dollar  as  the  banks,  while 
the  nonfinancing  affiliates’  ratios  were  even  higher. 
Table  IV  reports  the  average  rates  of  return  for 
the  holding  companies,  bank,  and  nonbank  subsidi- 
aries,  respectively,  for  each  year.  The  earning  trend 
of  the  holding  companies  was  dominated  by  the  con- 
tinual  improvement  in  profitability  of  their  bank 
affiliates  following  the  1974-75  recession.  The  reces- 
sion  affected  mortgage  affiliates  most  harshly.  The 
average  returns  on  equity  were  negative  in  1975  and 
1976.  The  especially  poor  average  performance  in 
these  years  is dominated  by  severe  losses  realized  by 
12 Evidence  from  consumer  finance  and  mortgage  affili- 
ates  [l,  13],  however,  suggest  a  movement  toward  greater 
leveraging  was  not  successful  in  improving  profitability. 
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RETURN  ON  ASSETS AND  EQUITY  CAPITAL 
BHC,  BANK,  AND  NONBANK  SUBSIDIARIES 
(By  Year)1 
BHCs 
Banks 
Mortgage  Banking 
Consumer  Finance 
Sales  Finance 




Data  Processing 
1975 
Net  Income/Assets  (%) 
1976  1977  1978 
.74  .77  .81  .86 
.79  .81  .83  .89 
.00  1.32  1.33  1.90 
1.18  1.26  9.75  4.76 
.44  1.15  4.80  1.32 
.62  -.14  1.89  4.08 
.95  1.79  1.05  1.13 
.35  11.13  3.82  -1.34 
11.00  24.30  24.60  21.53 
9.63  6.82  -7.80  2.30 
Net  Income/Equity  Capitol  (%) 
1975  1976  1977  1978 
10.42  11.84  12.77  13.72 
11.46  11.38  12.01  13.17 
-3.51  -1.38  2.70  6.91 
4.29  4.65  11.58  13.68 
3.21  7.90  16.33  5.42 
5.43  -14.68  22.74  14.82 
11.05  2.24  12.41  6.36 
2.62  25.15  13.74  -6.68 
25.22  84.25  55.60  83.11 
19.01  15.14  -7.80  10.16 
1 Reported  ratios  represent  the  overage  of  all  BHCs,  banks,  and  nonbank  subsidiaries  in  1975,  1976,  1977,  and  1978,  respectively. 
a few  companies.13  Profits  of  Fifth  District  mortgage 
affiliates  improved  significantly  in  1977 and  1978  but 
remained  far  behind  the  banks  in  terms  of  return  on 
investment.  Consumer  finance  companies,  with  re- 
turn  on  equity  less  than  half  that  of the  banks  in  1975 
and  1976, showed  considerable  income  growth,  attain- 
ing  virtual  parity  with  the  banks  in  1977  and  1978. 
Insurance  affiliates  consistently  turned  in  the  highest 
rates  of  return  and  were  apparently  not  adversely 
affected  by  the  recession.  Leasing  and  data  process- 
ing  show  no  discernible  trend  although  both  per- 
formed  relatively  well  during  the  recession.  No 
trend  is  evident  for  sales  and  commercial  finance  or 
factoring  subsidiaries.  The  small  number  of  com- 
panies  in  these  activities  within  the  District  cautions 
against  drawing  inferences  from  their  profit  per- 
formance. 
With  the  single  exception  of  insurance  affiliates, 
therefore,  investment  in  nonbank  subsidiaries  were 
less  profitable  than  bank  activities  for  Fifth  District 
holding  companies,  using  return  on  equity  as  the 
criteria.  Alternatively,  when  return  on  assets  is 
employed  as  the  profit  measure,  nonbank  operations 
were  apparently  more  profitable.  than  banking. 
The  profit  ratios  also  provide  some  insight  on 
whether  product-line  diversification  contributed  to 
stabilizing  profit  streams  of  bank  holding  companies. 
Correlation  coefficients  were  computed  between  rates 
of  return  for  banking  and  each  nonbanking  activity 
13 These  losses  were  over  fifty  percent  of  equity  per  year 
for  one  company  and  over  thirty  percent  for  two  others. 
If  these  three  firms  were  eliminated  from  the  sample,  the 
average  return  on  equity  over  the  four-year  period  would 
improve  from  2.55  percent  to  8.13  percent. 
of Fifth  District  firms  over  the  1975-78  period.  Ten- 
tative  results  (see  Table  V)  suggest  that  diversifica- 
tion  benefits  may  be  difficult  to  realize  in  mortgage 
banking,  consumer  finance,  and  commercial  finance, 
since  these  activities  demonstrated  relatively  high 
positive  correlations  with  banking.  This  is  not  too 
surprising,  however,  since  banks  directly  engage  in 
mortgage,  consumer,  and  commercial  lending  to 
major  degrees.  Insurance  activities  of  Fifth  District 
companies  were  also  positively  correlated  with  bank- 
ing.  This  evidence  runs  counter  to  previous  findings 
that  life  insurance  industry  returns  were  negatively 
correlated  with  banking  returns.  It  should  be  re- 
membered,  however,  that  bank  holding  company  in- 
surance  activities  are  restricted  by  regulation.  The 
profit  experience  of  insurance  affiliates,  therefore, 
may  differ  from  the  rest  of  the  industry.  It  also 
Table  V 
CORRELATION  COEFFICIENTS  BETWEEN  BANK 
AND  NONBANK  RATES  OF  RETURN 
Correlation  with  Banking 
Income/Assets  Income  to Equity 
Banking  1.000  1.000 
Mortgage  Banking  .839  .950 
Consumer  Finance  .408  .906 
Sales  Finance  .153  -.020 
Commercial  Finance  .931  .590 
leasing  -.122  .004 
Factoring  -.442  -.728 
Insurance  .442  .444 
Data  Processing  -.387  -.273 
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insurance  operations  were  substantial,  probably 
eliminating  any  need  to  find  risk-reducing  benefits  of 
diversification.  The  remaining  nonbank  activities 
apparently  offered  Fifth  District  firms  some  degree  of 
reduced  risk  through  diversification,  at  least  over  the 
limited  period  under  examination.  Leasing  and  sales 
finance  activities  exhibited  either  low  negative  or 
positive  correlation  with  banking,  depending  on 
which  profit  ratio  was  analyzed.  Factoring  and  data 
processing  subsidiaries  realized  rates  of  return  on 
assets  and  equity  that  were  correlated  negatively  with 
banking-suggesting  reduced  variability  of  profits 
for  Fifth  District  holding  companies  that  combined 
these  activities  with  banking.  A  note  of  caution 
should  be  injected  into  the  interpretation  of  these 
results.  Correlation  coefficients  estimated  from  in- 
dustry  (or  company)  averages  using  only  a  few 
years  data  must  be  considered  tentative  and  cannot 
be  relied  upon  as  strong  supporting  evidence.  Too 
few  data  observations  are  utilized  for  the  estimates 
to  achieve  statistical  significance. 
To  increase  the  number  of  observations  used  in 
the  calculation  of  correlation  coefficients  between 
banking  and  each  nonbanking  activity,  an  effort  was 
made  to  pool  the  cross-section  and  time-series  data 
included  in the  analysis  [6].  Relevant  statistical  tests 
(F-tests)  revealed  that  this  technique  was. only  ap- 
propriate  in  the  estimates  involving  the  consumer 
finance  and  leasing  subsidiaries.  The  correlation 
coefficients  estimated  using  the  pooled  income  to 
equity  ratios  for  these  two  activities  were  +.042  and 
+.278,  respectively.  The  estimated  correlation  co- 
efficient  between  banking  and  consumer  finance  affili- 
ates  was  greatly  reduced  using  this  technique  while 
that  between  banking  and  leasing  was  slightly  in- 
creased. 
Summary  In  summary,  nearly  five  percent  of 
the  total  assets  of  Fifth  District  holding  companies 
are  held  in nonbank  subsidiaries.  Lending  operations 
such  as  mortgage  banking,  finance  companies,  leas- 
ing,  and  factoring  constitute  the  bulk  of  this  activity, 
but  many  District  firms  also  operate  data  processing 
and  credit  insurance  affiliates.  With  the  exception 
of  insurance  operations,  rates  of  return  on  equity 
investment  in  these  nonbank  subsidiaries  have  not 
matched  those  generated  from  bank  affiliates  in recent 
years.  This  result  reflects  the  lower  equity  capital  to 
assets  ratios  that  banks  are  enabled  to  maintain  due 
to  their  deposit  powers.  Rates  of  return  on  total 
assets,  in  contrast,  have  favored  nonbank  operations. 
Lower  (average)  rates  of  return  on  equity  invest- 
ment  do  not  necessarily  imply  that  holding  company 
diversification  into  nonbank  areas  has  adversely  af- 
fected  bank  holding  company  performance.  Eco- 
nomic  theory  and  recent  experience  suggests  that 
average  rates  of  return  can  be  misleading.  Basic 
economic  principles  show  that  total  profits  can  be 
increased  by  investing  in  nonbank  areas  with  lower 
average  rates  of  return  than  banking-provided  non- 
bank  investments  yield  higher  marginal  returns  than 
the  banking  alternative.  Also,  preliminary  evidence 
suggests  that  some  nonbank  activities  of  bank  holding 
companies  may  have  contributed  to  reducing  the 
variability  of  the  consolidated  firms’  profit  streams. 
GLOSSARY  OF  NONBANK  ACTIVITIES 
Commercial  Finance  Companies  providing  financ- 
ing  of  business  accounts  receivables  and  of  sales  of 
commercial,  industrial,  and  farm  equipment. 
Consumer  Finance  Companies  making  direct  cash 
loans  on  an  instalment  basis  to  individuals. 
lated  to  an  extension  of  credit  or  that  is  provided 
solely  for  the  convenience  of  the  purchaser;  acting 
as  insurance  underwriter  directly  or  as  reinsurer 
for  credit  accident  and  health  insurance  directly 
related  to  an  extension  of  credit  by  the  holding 
company  system. 
Data  Processing  Companies  providing  computer 
software  services  and  data  processing  consisting  of 
the  preparation  of  reports  from  data  supplied  by 
the  customer.  Includes  companies  providing  ser- 
vices  solely  for  the  internal  operations  of  the  bank 
holding  company  system  as  well  as  for  the  general 
public. 
Factoring  Companies  engaged  in  factoring  and 
rediscounting  of  accounts  receivable,  commercial 
paper,  and  instalment  notes. 
Leasing  Companies  engaged  in  the  direct  leasing 
of  property  and  equipment  to  the  general  public  or 
to  other  affiliates  within  the  same  holding  com- 
pany. 
Mortgage  Banking  Companies  originating  and  ser- 
vicing  loans  secured  by  real  estate  or  providing 
Insurance  Companies  providing  insurance  agent 
or  broker  services  for  their  parent  company  or  any 
subsidiary;  providing  insurance  that  is  directly  re- 
financing  secured  by  real  estate  for  construction 
projects. 
Sales  Finance  Companies  purchasing  instalment 
paper  which  arises  from  retail  sales  of  passenger 
automobiles,  mobile  homes,  other  consumer  goods, 
or  expenditures  for  home  improvements. 
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